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ABSTRACT
Law n. 11,638/2007 legitimized the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption process in Brazil and 
introduced an accounting system detached from tax purposes in the country. This law aims to reduce the influence of tax 
law on accounting standards and improve the quality of financial reporting, as IFRS are considered to be higher quality 
standards. International literature shows a reduction in earnings quality in environments where accounting and tax rules 
are strongly linked. Moreover, the influence of tax legislation on financial accounting is seen to encourage unconditional 
conservatism, a bias with no advantages for financial market efficiency. Thus, tax neutrality is expected to provide a more 
favorable institutional environment for quality financial reporting by detaching corporate accounting from tax accounting. 
In light of the above, this study aims to verify whether the advent of tax neutrality influences unconditional conservatism 
in Brazilian public companies. The methodology used involves panel data regressions. The sample consists of non-financial 
publicly-traded companies with information published in Economática® covering 2002 to 2014. The results show differences 
in the relationship between taxation and financial reporting between firms that are subject to different levels of monitoring 
in the Brazilian stock market. Evidence of unconditional conservatism is only found in companies that are subject to greater 
market monitoring. In this group, it is observed that taxation does not induce unconditional conservatism in reported 
earnings, which is expected in a tax neutrality context.
Keywords: conservatism, tax neutrality, book-tax conformity, quality of accounting information, taxation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increased information quality aft er the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
depends on at least two factors. First, there is the 
assumption that IFRS consist of a set of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) that lead to better quality 
fi nancial reporting. Moreover, it should be considered 
that the accounting system is only one component of a 
country’s institutional environment and is infl uenced 
by the set of incentives for fi nancial disclosure that this 
environment provides (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007).
It is unlikely that a single set of accounting rules 
incorporates similar qualitative attributes into the 
fi nancial statements of heterogeneous economies. High 
quality accounting standards do not guarantee improved 
fi nancial reporting, as the incentives and demand for 
information are more important than the imposition of 
external accounting standards in markets that seek better 
quality for their fi nancial reports (Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003). 
Diff erences between countries in terms of information 
quality may remain aft er IFRS adoption, as fi nancial 
reports depend on the overall institutional context of 
fi rms, which includes the legal and political systems of 
the jurisdictions in which their fi nancial statements are 
published (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). Financial reports are 
understood here as a set of fi nancial statements published 
by a company in a particular period. 
In Brazil, until 2007 accounting practice was intensely 
infl uenced by the system for calculating income tax, which 
led to a high level of book-tax conformity (BTC) in the 
country. Traditionally, Brazilian tax legislation infl uenced 
published fi nancial statements, with statements for market 
disclosure purposes oft en being indistinct from statements 
for tax purposes (Lopes & Walker, 2008).
BTC can be defi ned as the fl exibility a fi rm has for 
reporting a diff erent taxable income from accounting 
profi t before income tax (Hanlon, Maydew & Shevlin, 
2008). Th e freedom of managers to release information 
on company performance without incurring tax penalties 
is the main benefi t of less BTC in an economy (Atwood, 
Drake & Myers, 2010).
Studies indicate that high levels of BTC can result 
in excessive conservatism in reported results, which 
minimizes earnings quality (Atwood et al., 2010; Hanlon 
et al., 2008). Soderstrom and Sun (2007) indicate that, 
among the advantages related to the change in accounting 
principles due to IFRS, the concept of “true and fair 
view” can reduce levels of book-tax conformity so that 
accounting better refl ects the economic reality of fi rms.
Law n. 11,638/2007 (Brasil, 2007) stands out in this 
context for institutionalizing IFRS convergence in Brazil 
and detaching accounting standards from tax purposes, 
which led to the beginning of tax neutrality. Given that the 
literature suggests a loss in earnings quality when fi nancial 
reporting is associated with tax rules (Hanlon, Laplante 
& Shevlin, 2005), it is inferred that tax neutrality favors 
the reporting of higher quality accounting information. 
Lopes and Mosquera (2010) argue that IFRS adoption in 
Brazil must involve the independence of accounting in 
relation to taxation, with tax neutrality being a necessary 
condition for the convergence process in the country. Th is 
occurs since a reduction in conservative bias can mitigate 
the expropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders, 
as well as increasing the quality of fi nancial information.
While conditional conservatism refers to the upfront 
recognition of economic losses that have not yet been 
incurred, in light of indications of negative results, 
unconditional conservatism involves the persistent 
undervaluation of net assets (Beaver & Ryan, 2005). Among 
the incentives for practicing unconditional conservatism, 
Watts (2003a, 2003b) highlights the infl uences of tax 
legislation on fi nancial accounting practices, as well as 
litigation costs and regulatory forces. 
Th e advent of tax neutrality can increase the incentives 
for quality accounting information, since the link between 
tax and corporate norms imposes a dilemma on managers 
by attributing a dual role to accounting (Goncharov 
& Zimmermann, 2005). Along with other attributes, 
it is hoped that tax neutrality provides Brazil with an 
institutional environment that is conducive to improved 
fi nancial reporting, especially in entities that are subject to 
greater market monitoring or those with greater incentives 
for disclosure. 
In this context, this article aims to verify whether 
the advent of tax neutrality infl uences unconditional 
conservatism in publicly-traded companies in Brazil. To 
achieve this objective, the study is based on the assumption 
that companies in the Brazilian stock market are subject 
to diff erent levels of monitoring. Given the incentives for 
fi rms to engage in fi nancial disclosure (Ball et al., 2003), 
it is inferred that diff erent levels of monitoring can lead 
to heterogeneous accounting choices with regards to 
unconditional conservatism, even in the context of tax 
neutrality.
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2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In code-law countries, litigation costs and tax infl uences 
usually promote excessive conservatism in accounting, as 
they encourage managers to restrict the concept of asset 
and carry out reductions and minimize the recognition 
of these elements in fi nancial statements (Watts, 2003a, 
2003b). Known as unconditional conservatism or balance 
sheet conservatism, this process implies undervaluing a 
fi rm’s book-to-market (BTM) ratio (Gotti, 2008). Using 
historic cost as the recognition basis for projects with 
positive net present value and accelerated depreciation 
and amortization with regards to the estimated economic 
life of assets, are also examples of practices indicative of 
unconditional conservatism (Beaver & Ryan, 2005).
Under this form of conservatism, the accounting value 
of net assets is underestimated due to predetermined 
aspects in the accounting process. For Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), it involves a bias that withholds information from 
investors as it involves an adjustment carried out ex ante 
by the contracting parties. Th us, accounting does not 
react when new information occurs, as unconditional 
conservatism incorporates undervaluations up front, 
which means that its adoption does not present any 
advantages from a market effi  ciency point of view. In the 
literature, studies regarding the infl uence of tax legislation 
on fi nancial accounting are recurrent (Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005; Beaver & Ryan, 2005; Kim & Jung, 2007; Watts, 
2003a, 2003b).
Taxation is a relevant aspect of the quality of reported 
information, as a close link between accounting profi t and 
taxable income reduces the ability for fi nancial reporting 
to show the economic reality of an entity. Moreover, 
higher rates of income tax off er incentives for reducing 
taxable income, implying lower accounting profi t in high 
BTC environments. Th is harms the fi nancial market, as 
unlike shareholders and creditors, tax authorities are less 
adversely aff ected in cases of information asymmetry, 
since they have greater autonomy and powers to inspect 
fi rms (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007).
Given that economic consequences and confl icts of 
interest are diff erent in the fi rm/tax authority and fi rm/
investor contractual relationships, the aims of accounting 
profit and taxable income are different (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010; Shackelford, Slemrod & Sallee, 2011). 
In light of this, tax neutrality is an important step towards 
producing more relevant accounting information, the 
more detachment between fi nancial and tax accounting 
is formalized. In the international literature, Atwood et 
al. (2010) and Hanlon et al. (2008) fi nd evidence that 
greater connections between accounting profi t and taxable 
income reduce earnings quality. In Brazil, Cardoso, Costa, 
and Ávila (2016) fi nd indications that the detachment 
of corporate from tax accounting is associated with an 
improvement in the quality of accounting information 
reported in the country aft er IFRS adoption.
BTC imposes a close relationship between accounting 
profi t and taxable income. For this reason, strategies 
focused on reducing taxable income would result in lower 
accounting profi ts in environments with high levels of 
conformity. Given that companies would be concerned 
about disclosing large diff erences between accounting 
profi t and taxable income in these environments, the 
option for managers would be to reduce accounting profi t 
in order to minimize taxation costs. Th is relationship 
between accounting profi t and taxable income creates a 
link between taxation and fi nancial reporting in that the 
infl uence of taxation on corporate accounting tends to 
induce conservatism in reported earnings (Shackelford 
& Shevlin, 2001).
Managers have incentives to behave conservatively 
in environments with higher levels of BTC, as a greater 
link between accounting profit and taxable income 
makes a reduction in the present value of tax expenses 
possible when accounting is conservative (Bushman & 
Pietroski, 2006). Shackelford et al. (2011) add that the 
infl uence of taxation on earnings reported to the market 
is not desirable, since given the diff erences in the aims 
of fi nancial and tax reporting, it is not unusual for the 
most informative measure of income for shareholders to 
be diff erent from the most useful measure of income for 
tax authorities. Empirical evidence confi rms that taxation 
induces unconditional conservatism in environments in 
which accounting profi t and taxable income are strongly 
related (Kim & Jung, 2007; Lara, Osma & Penalva, 2009; 
Qiang, 2007). Hanlon et al. (2008) fi nd indications that 
these circumstances reduce earnings quality.
In Brazil, tax neutrality allows IFRS adoption to present 
no impacts on taxable income calculations. Th erefore, it 
is to be expected that the introduction of an accounting 
system that is detached from tax purposes can minimize 
the infl uence of tax planning on conservative accounting 
choices.
Despite detachment between accounting profi t and 
taxable income being possible due to Law n. 11,638/2007 
(Brasil, 2007), an absence of fi rm economic incentives 
may not lead to the changes expected from BTC in certain 
companies.
Unconditional conservatism in Brazilian public companies and tax neutrality
200 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 74, p. 197-212, mai./ago. 2017
Interests in aggressive tax planning practices and the 
cost of control inherent to detachment from tax norms 
can encourage managers to keep fi nancial accounting 
linked to tax legislation. Guenther, Maydem, and Nutter 
(1997) conclude that even with the existence of diff erent 
recognition methods in determining accounting profi t and 
taxable income, some managers are resistant to recording 
transactions that increase accounting profi t without 
increasing taxable income or that increase deductible 
expenses without increasing accounting expenses.
The flexibility of IFRS offers a certain degree of 
discretion to managers, in that accounting choices can 
be guided by procedures imposed by tax legislation, if this 
fi ts the manager’s interest. Gee, Haller, and Nobes (2010) 
verify that taxes infl uence reporting under IFRS and part 
of this infl uence can result in costs that are necessary for 
managing two parallel accounting systems, one for the 
purposes of reporting to investors and creditors and the 
other for tax purposes.
Given that companies from the same country have 
diff erent incentives with regards to fi nancial reporting 
(Ball et al., 2003), the advent of tax neutrality can present 
diff erent impacts on fi rms that are subject to heterogeneous 
economic incentives, especially with regards to capital 
market monitoring.
In this study, the Bovespa index (Ibovespa) is used 
as a proxy for greater market monitoring, as it features 
a portfolio that is representative of the most highly 
tradable assets that most represent the Brazilian stock 
market. In comparison with other publicly-traded 
companies in Brazil, those that compose the Ibovespa 
have a greater number of investors monitoring their 
fi nancial reports, which implies greater demand for quality 
accounting information. Providing better information 
helps companies to remain within the portfolio, which 
suggests that the Ibovespa can be used as a proxy for 
identifying companies that are subject to greater stock 
market monitoring.
In light of the above, it is assumed that fi rms that are 
subject to greater market monitoring have more economic 
incentives to abandon BTC and present less unconditional 
conservatism in reported income from 2008 onwards, as 
proposed by the research hypothesis.
H1: unconditional conservatism in the income reported 
by Brazilian publicly-traded companies that are subject 
to greater stock market monitoring reduces aft er the 
advent of tax neutrality, with the passing of Law n. 
11,638/2007 (Brasil, 2007).
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
3.1 Description of the Econometric Model Used
The empirical investigation of the relationship 
between unconditional conservatism and tax neutrality is 
conducted via the analysis of panel data. Th e econometric 
model proposed derives from that used by Qiang (2007) 
in order to adapt a model that is already consolidated in 
the literature to the specifi c characteristics of the study.
Th e proxy used to measure unconditional conservatism 
in this study is a modifi cation of the bias component 
proposed by Beaver and Ryan (2000). The authors 
distinguish between two sources of variation for the BTM 
ratio, called “bias” and “lag” in accounting recognition. 
Both behaviors are related to the recognition process in 
accounting, however, bias is a persistent phenomenon, 
while lag is a temporary phenomenon (Beaver & Ryan, 
2000). Th e BTM ratio is the ratio between a fi rm’s book 
value and market value. 
According to Beaver and Ryan (2000), “bias” in 
accounting recognition refers to the book value being 
persistently lower (greater) than the market value of a fi rm, 
which makes the BTM ratio persistently lower (higher) 
than 1. Th is distortion known as bias would result in the 
joint eff ect of interaction between characteristics of the 
accounting process, such as conservatism and historic 
cost, and the economic environment of a fi rm. As for 
the distortion identifi ed as “lag”, this would derive from 
the fact that unexpected economic gains are recognized 
in book value over time, instead of immediately, which 
would make the BTM ratio temporarily lower than its 
average in the short term.
Th e use of a proxy based on BTM aims to refl ect 
the effect of conservatism in book value per share 
(BVPS). Th us, market value is used as a reference to 
measure conservatism as a persistent bias that reduces 
the book value of equity (Lara et al., 2009).  Th e non-
persistent component refers to the lag in accounting 
recognition. Beaver and Ryan (2000) fi nd evidence that 
the persistent bias component is associated with measures 
of unconditional conservatism, while lag is not.
In the Beaver and Ryan (2000) model, expressed in 
equation 1, conservatism is measured by a fi rm’s fi xed 
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eff ects (intercept) in a regression that considers the BTM 
ratio as a dependent variable and return as an independent 
variable. Th e fi xed eff ect aims to capture the time variation 
in the recognition of gains and losses in the BVPS (book-
value) of each fi rm. Current returns are a proxy for new 
information and the coeffi  cients of returns capture the 
lag with which accounting incorporates the information 
already priced by the market. Th e under or overvaluation 
of book value not explained by returns is captured by 
the fi rm intercept, which measures the persistent bias. 
Th is bias measured by the intercept is understood as a 
measure of unconditional conservatism when it presents 
a result lower than 1.
  ????? = ??  +??????? ??????? +  ???          [1]   
in which BTMjt is the BTM ratio for fi rm j at the end of 
period t (Book Value per Share / Closing Quotation); and 
RETjt is the rate of return (ln (Quotation t / Quotation (t-1)))
for fi rm j in period t, in which t varies from 1 to 6, 
indicating that current returns are considered as well as 
the returns occurring in the last six years. In equation 
1, the BTM is regressed by current and lagged returns, 
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and 
controlling for the fi xed eff ects of the fi rms.
Th e “fi xed eff ect” identifi ed by the αj intercept is 
expected to be equal to the firm’s BTM ratio in the 
isolated presence of bias, that is, in the absence of lags 
in accounting recognition (Beaver & Ryan, 2000). Th is 
means that the intercept shows what the average BTM of 
the fi rms would be if the accounting timelily recognized 
the same economic gains already priced by the market.
It is known, however, that the accounting recognition 
process is linked to norms that aim to protect investors. 
For this reason, share prices can incorporate news on the 
outlook for future earnings that the accounting is not 
yet able to recognize. Given that returns are a proxy for 
new information, the βΤ coeffi  cients capture the lag in 
accounting recognition in equation 1, that is, the portion 
of the variation in share price not yet recognized in the 
accounting.
Th e model restricts the coeffi  cients of returns so that 
they capture symmetrical lags between good and bad 
news, with asymmetric lags and persistent bias captured 
by the fi rm intercept (Qiang, 2007). Th is causes noise 
in the results, given that the intercept captures both the 
unconditional bias and the conditional bias not captured 
by the coeffi  cients of returns (Lara et al., 2009; Qiang, 
2007).
As in equation 2, the adaptation proposed by Qiang 
(2007) includes a dummy variable for return in the model 
that allows the coeffi  cients to be asymmetric in relation 
to positive and negative returns. With the inclusion of 
this variable, the return terms incorporate symmetric and 
asymmetric lags and the fi rm intercept (αj) only captures 
the unconditional bias, thus being a more accurate proxy 
for unconditional conservatism (Lara et al., 2009; Qiang, 
2007).
In this sense, aft er controlling for market performance, 
from the moment of incorporating lagged returns in the 
model, the closer the value of the estimated coeffi  cient  ?? j
is to 1, the closer the company’s book value, represented 
by BVPS, is to its market value (Qiang, 2007). It 
should be reiterated that, although the specific 
intercept of fi rms can incorporate a large increase (?? j
greater than 1), it is the persistent bias for reduction 
(intercept lower than 1) that is associated with 
unconditional conservatism.
CSVj = 1 – ?? j; with ?? j given by: 
    ????? = ??  +??????? ??????? +???????? ?????? ? ??????? +  ???         [2]  
1
2
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in which CSVj is the book-value-based measure of 
unconditional conservatism for fi rm j over the time series; 
BTMjt is the BTM ratio for fi rm j at the end of period t; 
RETjt is the rate of return for fi rm j in period t, and DRjt is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if RETjt is negative 
and 0 otherwise. In equation 2 the BTM is regressed by 
return and by the interactive dummies for return using 
the OLS estimator and controlling for the fi xed eff ects 
of the fi rms.
In the model, an estimated coeffi  cient (?? j) that is lower 
than 1 is understood as being a persistent bias for reducing 
the book value in relation to the economic value of a fi rm 
(Beaver & Ryan, 2000). Th e bias is considered persistent, 
as even the incorporation of current and lagged returns is 
not able to explain the undervaluation of BVPS in relation 
to its market price. Th erefore, a lower coeffi  cient, but closer 
to 1, indicates that the accounting system more completely 
incorporates a fi rm’s economic value represented by the 
price; that is, the accounting is less conservative. 
3.1.1 Unconditional conservatism model and the 
infl uence of taxation.
Qiang (2007) finds evidence that the possibility 
of reducing taxation costs resulting from BTC leads 
to unconditional conservatism in reported income. 
To analyze the relationship between unconditional 
conservatism and BTC, the author includes into equation 
2 a proxy that measures the possibility of reducing taxation 
costs (BTC variable), which results in equation 3.
CSVj = 1 – ?? j; with ?? j given by: 
    ????? = ?? +??????? ??????? +???????? ?????? ? ??????? +??????? ???? ? ?????? ? ??????? + ???   [3]  
in which CSVj is a book-value-based measure of 
unconditional conservatism for fi rm j over the time series; 
BTMjt is the BTM ratio for fi rm j at the end of period t; 
RETjt is the rate of return for fi rm j in period t; DRjt is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if RETjt is negative 
and 0 otherwise, and BTCj is the proxy of BTC for fi rm j, 
calculated according to equation 4. In equation 3, BTM 
is regressed by return, by the interactive dummies for 
return, and by the interactions between the BTC variable 
and the dummies for return. Th e OLS estimator is used, 
controlling for the fi xed eff ects of the fi rms.
In the regression, the measure of conservatism is given 
by CSVj = 1 – ?? j, when  is lower than 1. Th e BTCj variable 
captures the level of conformity between accounting profi t 
and taxable income and is given by the ??  1j coeffi  cient, 
estimated by equation 4.
   ???? =  ???  +  ??? ???? + ??,?         [4]   
in which ??  1j is the connection between accounting profi t 
and taxable income (BTC measure) for fi rm j in the period 
analyzed; DFjt is the taxation expense [revenue or expense 
for income tax and social security contributions (IT&SS)] 
for fi rm j in year t, and ITjt is the current income tax 
[current income tax and social security contributions 
(IncTax)]. In equation 4, the current income tax is 
regressed by the taxation expense using the OLS estimator. 
Th e estimated coeffi  cient ??  1j measures the connection 
between accounting profi t and taxable income, used as 
a proxy for BTC.
According to Qiang (2007), a stronger connection 
between accounting profi t and taxable income represents 
a greater level of BTC and indicates a higher possibility 
of reducing taxation costs when reducing accounting 
profi t. Given that the expected reduction in taxation 
costs increases the closer the relationship is between 
accounting and tax systems, the connection between 
accounting profi t and taxable income acts as a proxy for 
the possibility of reducing taxation costs and is a measure 
of BTC (Qiang, 2007).
Equation 5 substitutes the specifi c intercept of the 
fi rms (∝j) for the BTCj variable in equation 3 with the 
aim of verifying whether BTC infl uences the measure of 
persistent bias. Th e intention behind this substitution is to 
verify whether the relationship between accounting profi t 
and taxable income (BTC measure) leads to unconditional 
conservatism (∝j) in the fi rms analyzed.
3
4
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   ????? = ? ????  +  ???
?
???
??????? +???
?
?
???
?????? ? ???????
+???
?
???
???? ? ?????? ? ??????? +  ???         [5]    
Given that a lower fi rm intercept indicates greater 
unconditional conservatism in reported results, the 
coeffi  cients of the variables indicative of factors that 
lead to the phenomenon are expected to be negative and 
statistically signifi cant (Qiang, 2007). Th is verifi cation 
occurs in statistical soft ware by applying the OLS estimator 
for equation 5 and selecting the “without constant” option.
in which BTCj is the BTC proxy for fi rm j calculated in 
accordance with equation 4; BTMjt is the BTM ratio for 
fi rm j at the end of period t; RETjt is the rate of return for 
fi rm j in period t, and DRjt is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if RETjt is negative and 0 otherwise. In equation 
5, BTM is regressed by the BTC proxy, by return, by the 
interactive dummies for return, and by the interactions 
between the BTC variable and the return dummies. Th e 
OLS estimator is used in a regression generated without 
the interception term (regression that passes through 
the origin).
Th e results from the regression without the constant 
(equation 5) allow for comparison between the estimated 
coeffi  cient for the BTC variable and the intercept estimated 
for the fi rms by equation 3. A negative and statistically 
signifi cant coeffi  cient indicates that the BTC variable 
negatively infl uences a fi rms’ BTM, suggesting that the 
connection between accounting profi t and taxable income 
leads to unconditional conservatism, measured by the 
persistent reduction bias. 
3.1.2 Unconditional conservatism model proposed.
As proposed by the research objective, this study 
intends to verify whether the advent of tax neutrality 
infl uences unconditional conservatism in publicly-traded 
Brazilian companies. To adapt the model from Qiang 
(2007) to the context studied, the periods before and aft er 
the advent of tax neutrality are analyzed simultaneously in 
the same regression. For this, equations 3 to 5 are adjusted 
by the inclusion of a dummy variable for year (DY) that 
takes the value 1 for 2008 onwards and 0 otherwise. Th ese 
adaptations result in equations 6 and 7, which follow the 
same operationalization standards as equations 3 and 5, 
respectively. 
In the model proposed by equations 6 and 7, it is 
possible to analyze the relationship between BTC and 
unconditional conservatism over the complete study 
horizon. Th e inclusion of the dummy variable DY derives 
from the eff ects that can arise regarding the fi rms’ BTC, 
given the advent of tax neutrality from 2008 onwards.
CSVj = 1 – ?? j; with ?? j given by: 
5
6
   ????? = ??  +  ???
?
???
??????? +????
?
???
?????? ? ??????? +???
?
???
????
? ?????? ? ???????  + ?????? +???
?
???
???? ? ?????? ? ???????
+ +???
?
???
???? ? ???? ? ?????? ? ??????? + ???          [6]    
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in which CSVj is the book-value-based unconditional 
conservatism measure for fi rm j over the course of the 
time series; BTMjt is the BTM ratio for fi rm j at the end of 
period t; RETjt is the rate of return for fi rm j in period t; 
DRjt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if RETjt is 
negative and 0 otherwise; BTCj is the BTC proxy for fi rm j 
calculated in accordance with equation 4, and  is an yearly 
dummy indicative of tax neutrality, which takes the value 
1 for the periods from 2008 onwards and 0 otherwise.
   ????? =  ? ????  +  ??????? ??????? +???????? ?????? ? ???????
+??????? ???? ? ?????? ? ???????  + ??????
+??????? ???? ? ?????? ? ???????
+ +??????? ???? ? ???? ? ?????? ? ??????? + ???          [7]   
in which BTCj is the BTC proxy for fi rm j calculated in 
accordance with equation 4; BTMjt is the BTM ratio for 
fi rm j at the end of period t; RETjt is the rate of return for 
fi rm j in period t; DRjt is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if RETjt is negative and 0 otherwise; and DYjt is an 
yearly dummy variable indicative of tax neutrality, which 
takes the value 1 for the periods from 2008 onwards and 
0 otherwise.
In light of the above, the econometric tests are 
carried out for the periods before (up to 2007) and aft er 
(from 2008 onwards) the advent of tax neutrality [Law 
n. 11,638/2007 (Brasil, 2007)] via equation 3 and 5. Th is 
segregation allows for the relationship between BTC and 
unconditional conservatism to be observed separately in 
the periods before and aft er the advent of tax neutrality. 
Equations 6 and 7 are used in the tests that include the 
complete study horizon.
Finally, the influence of tax neutrality over 
unconditional conservatism is analyzed separately for 
companies participating and those not participating in 
the Ibovespa. As proposed by the research hypothesis, a 
reduction is expected in unconditional conservatism in 
the income reported by the companies that are subject 
to greater stock market monitoring aft er the advent of 
tax neutrality, with the passing of Law n. 11,638/2007 
(Brasil, 2007).
3.2 Database
Th e data were gathered from the Economática® soft ware. 
Th e initial database is comprised of all the non-fi nancial 
companies that had active shares on the São Paulo Stock, 
Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) 
on April 15, 2015. We chose to capture the data relative 
to the most liquid shares of each company, according to 
the trading record on December 31, 2014. With the fi lter 
established, 355 active fi rms were identifi ed. 
Th e research horizon covers 2002 to 2014, so that it 
contemplates the periods before and aft er the beginning of 
tax neutrality in Brazil. In Economática® the following data 
were gathered: (i) BVPS, (ii) closing quotation, (iii) IT&SS, 
and (iv) IncTax. Th e data are on a yearly basis, adjusted for 
infl ation, extracted from the consolidated statements, and 
refer to December 31 of each fi nancial year. Th e closing 
quotation is adjusted for proceeds, including dividends, 
and considers lags of up to 20 days in order to reduce 
data lacking for low liquidity companies.
With the data gathered, the BTM (Book Value per 
7
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Share/Closing Quotation) and return [In (Quotationt/
Quotation(t-1))] variables were calculated. Observations 
with negative BTM were removed from the database. 
Th e same procedure was carried out with the localized 
observations based on three standards deviations above 
and below the average, as they were identifi ed as outliers 
that could cause distortions in the results analysis.
3.3 Sample Description
Th e fi rst sample treatment aims to maintain only 
companies for which it was possible to calculate the BTC 
proxy for both periods, before and aft er tax neutrality, 
in the database. Each fi rm’s BTC in each period was 
estimated in accordance with the adaptation of the time 
series regression proposed by Qiang (2007), presented 
in equation 4.
Two databases were initially elaborated. Th e fi rst refers 
to the periods from 2002 to 2007, before tax neutrality, 
and the second contemplates the periods from 2008 to 
2014, aft er the advent of neutrality [Law n. 11,638/2007 
(Brasil, 2007)]. Segregation of the database is necessary for 
carrying out the regressions that aim to estimate the level 
of BTC of the fi rms in each one of the periods analyzed.
With the regressions carried out, only the companies 
for which it was possible to calculate the BTC proxy for 
both periods were kept. As a result of unavailable or 
insuffi  cient data for carrying out these regressions, the 
sample was reduced to 232 companies. Out of these 232, 
61 opened up or closed capital during the study horizon, 
and were therefore excluded from the sample. Finally, 
insuffi  cient data for calculating the return (RET) and 
BMT variables for the 35 fi rms were identifi ed. In light 
of this, the fi nal sample is comprised of 136 companies.
Finally, in order for the research hypothesis tests to be 
carried out, the fi nal sample with 136 fi rms is separated 
into two subsamples representative of companies that are 
subject to more or less market monitoring, depending on 
participation or not in the Ibovespa.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
To meet the proposal of the research hypothesis, the 
descriptive statistics are presented separately for the 
samples representative of companies that are subject to 
diff erent levels of stock market monitoring: companies 
participating in the Ibovespa and companies not 
participating in the Ibovespa. 
In accordance with Table 1 comparing the periods 
before and aft er tax neutrality, it is verifi ed that the average 
for the BTC variable reduces for the group of companies 
that do not belong to the Ibovespa.
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In Table 1, for the Ibovespa group, the means and 
medians of these variables were greater in the period aft er 
the start of tax neutrality. It is noted that the standard 
deviation reduces in both subsamples, which indicates 
a reduction in the spread of the variable between the 
periods analyzed.
In comparing the period after in relation to the 
period before the advent of tax neutrality, no signifi cant 
diff erences were verifi ed between the medians of the BTC 
variable, for the two subsamples, as shown in Table 2. 
Due to the advent of tax neutrality from 2008 onwards, 
a signifi cant diff erence was expected for this variable 
between the two periods, at least for the companies subject 
to greater stock market monitoring.
Th e mean of the BTM variable presented a fall between 
the periods, both for the companies not participating in 
the Ibovespa and for those participating. It is noted that 
the mean and the median of the BTM variable are lower, 
in both periods, for the subsample representative of the 
companies that are under greater market monitoring.
It bears mentioning that, although a BTM lower 
than 1 may be associated with excessively conservative 
accounting choices, this pattern is preferable to a BTM 
that is persistently greater than 1, under the assumption 
that the market is able to adequately measure fi rm value. 
Th e data in Table 1 indicate that the fi rms subject to 
less monitoring tend to present an average BTM that is 
persistently greater than 1 in both the analysis periods.
A signifi cant diff erence is observed when comparing 
the BTC of companies participating in the Ibovespa with 
that of companies not participating, in the two periods 
analyzed, as shown in Table 2. Th is indicates a diff erence 
in the connection between accounting profi t and taxable 
income between companies subject to diff erent levels of 
Brazilian stock market monitoring.
Th e results in Table 2 confi rm that there is a signifi cant 
diff erence between the medians of the BTM variable for 
the two subsamples when the period aft er is compared 
to the period before tax neutrality. Moreover, there is a 
signifi cant diff erence between the medians of the BTM of 
companies participating in the Ibovespa compared with 
those not participating, in the two analysis periods. With 
regards to return (RET), it is verifi ed that the average for 
the variable is greater for the companies not participating 
in the Ibovespa, in both periods.
Table 1 Descriptive statistic: variables from the unconditional conservatism model
Period before tax neutrality (2002 to 2007)
BTC BTM RET
Not Ibovespa Ibovespa Not Ibovespa Ibovespa Not Ibovespa Ibovespa
Mean 0.53 0.46 1.53 1.20 0.30 0.26
Median 0.26 0.43 1.20 0.87 0.23 0.25
Minimum -4.69 -5.22 0.01 0.03 -0.93 -0.83
Maximum 4.90 4.00 5.52 5.05 2.40 1.72
Standard deviation 1.50 1.75 1.28 1.09 0.54 0.39
C.V. 2.83 3.77 0.84 0.90 1.78 1.47
Bias 0.26 -1.56 1.14 1.56 0.83 0.45
Ex. kurtosis 1.87 4.31 0.61 2.07 1.20 1.97
5% percentile -1.88 -5.02 0.17 0.14 -0.48 -0.39
95% percentile 3.82 3.33 4.20 3.88 1.25 0.87
Interquartile coeffi cient 1.39 0.70 1.68 1.19 0.66 0.40
Period after tax neutrality (2008 to 2014)
Mean 0.45 0.61 1.18 0.79 -0.02 -0.03
Median 0.39 0.77 0.91 0.72 0.01 -0.02
Minimum -0.79 -0.30 0.00 0.04 -1.99 -1.54
Maximum 2.11 1.34 5.47 3.71 2.14 1.43
Standard deviation 0.47 0.46 0.97 0.61 0.63 0.46
C.V. 1.04 0.74 0.82 0.78 27.85 13.29
Bias 0.31 -0.45 1.72 1.50 -0.23 -0.28
Ex.kurtosis 0.25 -0.93 3.43 3.71 0.86 0.77
5% percentile -0.15 -0.26 0.20 0.07 -1.16 -0.85
95% percentile 1.08 1.22 3.19 1.86 1.03 0.68
Interquartile coeffi cient 0.81 0.77 1.06 0.79 0.69 0.50
BTM = book-to-market; C.V. = coef cient of variation; BTC = book-tax conformity; Ibovespa = Bovespa index; RET = return.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Table 2 Results from the tests of difference
 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests (p two-tailed)
(null hypothesis: the two medians are equal)
Test variable
BTM RET BTC
Before vs. after 
Ibovespa 0.000340*** 0.000000*** 0.349788
Not Ibovespa 0.000685*** 0.000000*** 0.491633
Ibovespa vs. not Ibovespa
Before 0.002826*** 0.915465 0.007464***
After 0.000000*** 0.044509** 0.000001***
BTM = book-to-market; BTC = book-tax conformity; Ibovespa = Bovespa index; RET = return.
 ***, **, *: statistical signi cance to 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 3 Correlation coef cients between the RET and BTC variable
Ibovespa
5% critical value (bilateral) = 0.0947 for n = 429
RET BTC
1 0.0269 RET
- 1 BTC
Not Ibovespa
5% critical value (bilateral) = 0.0536 for n = 1339
CCF RET
1 -0.0095 BTC
- 1 RET
BTC = book-tax conformity; Ibovespa = Bovespa index; RET = return.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
4.2 Results for the Unconditional Conservatism 
Model
In accordance with the research hypothesis, we sought 
to verify if unconditional conservatism reduces in the 
companies subject to greater stock market monitoring 
aft er the advent of tax neutrality. For this reason, the results 
are presented separately between companies participating 
in the Ibovespa and companies not participating in the 
Ibovespa.
Th e correlation between return and BTC is presented in 
Table 3 and does not indicate problems of multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variables in the model.
4.2.1 Results for the companies participating in the 
Ibovespa.
Considering the complete study horizon, the average 
intercept of the fi rms (“const” in Table 4 – Results for 
equation 6) is lower than 1 (0.746), indicating that, on 
average, the book value of the fi rms analyzed is lower than 
their market value, which is consistent with the presence 
of unconditional conservatism in reported earnings.
In the econometric model used, unconditional 
conservatism is represented by a persistent reduction 
bias (value lower than 1) in the average coeffi  cient for 
the fi rms estimated based on equation 6. In this equation, 
the measure of unconditional conservatism is given by 
CSVj = 1 – ?? j from which it is concluded that, on average, 
the book value of the fi rms that comprise the sample is 
25.4% (CSVj = 1 – 0.746) lower than their market value.
With the aim of confi rming indications of the direct 
influence of BTC over unconditional conservatism, 
we observe the results generated by equation 7. By 
substituting the specifi c intercept of the fi rms for the 
BTC proxy in equation 6, the intention is to observe 
the effect of BTC over unconditional conservatism 
in a specifi c way. In this model it is expected that the 
coeffi  cients of the variables indicative of factors that lead to 
unconditional conservatism are negative and statistically 
signifi cant, given that a lower fi rm intercept indicates more 
conservative reported earnings (Qiang, 2007).
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Table 4 Results from the unconditional conservatism model for the Ibovespa sample: complete study horizon
Book-value-based measure of unconditional conservatism
Companies participating in the Ibovespa
Dependent variable = BTM
Results for equation 6 Results for equation 7
R² within 0.6483       R² adjusted 0.6940      
p (F) 0.0000       p (F) 0.0000      
Variable Coeffi cient
Standard
error
t-ratio p Coeffi cient
Standard
error
t-ratio p
const 0.746 0.249 3.001 0.003*** BTC 0.347 0.088 3.943 0.000***
RETt -0.302 0.141 -2.139 0.034** RETt -0.234 0.216 -1.083 0.280
RETt_1 -0.402 0.134 -3.005 0.003*** RETt_1 -0.346 0.210 -1.649 0.101
RETt_2 -0.345 0.159 -2.178 0.031** RETt_2 -0.489 0.186 -2.624 0.009***
RETt_3 0.013 0.162 0.081 0.935 RETt_3 -0.104 0.154 -0.679 0.498
RETt_4 0.001 0.159 0.008 0.994 RETt_4 -0.017 0.150 -0.114 0.909
RETt_5 0.083 0.095 0.871 0.385 RETt_5 -0.069 0.150 -0.463 0.644
RETt_6 0.088 0.066 1.329 0.185 RETt_6 0.318 0.135 2.346 0.020**
DR_RETt -1.645 0.839 -1.961 0.051* DR_RETt -1.283 1.027 -1.249 0.213
DR_RETt_1 -0.533 0.308 -1.731 0.085* DR_RETt_1 0.278 0.845 0.329 0.743
DR_RETt_2 -1.447 0.623 -2.321 0.021** DR_RETt_2 -1.764 0.607 -2.907 0.004***
DR_RETt_3 -1.039 0.416 -2.497 0.013** DR_RETt_3 -2.242 0.626 -3.583 0.000***
DR_RETt_4 -0.804 0.438 -1.837 0.068* DR_RETt_4 -2.777 0.554 -5.010 0.000***
DR_RETt_5 -0.163 0.157 -1.040 0.300 DR_RETt_5 -1.215 0.428 -2.841 0.005***
DR_RETt_6 -0.018 0.160 -0.115 0.909 DR_RETt_6 -0.864 0.355 -2.432 0.016**
BTC_DR_RETt -0.496 0.626 -0.792 0.429 BTC_DR_RETt 0.357 1.052 0.339 0.735
BTC_DR_RETt_1 -0.394 0.389 -1.013 0.312 BTC_DR_RETt_1 -0.590 0.822 -0.718 0.474
BTC_DR_RETt_2 0.242 0.265 0.911 0.363 BTC_DR_RETt_2 0.892 0.614 1.452 0.148
BTC_DR_RETt_3 0.027 0.188 0.146 0.884 BTC_DR_RETt_3 0.934 0.640 1.458 0.146
BTC_DR_RETt_4 -0.154 0.277 -0.558 0.578 BTC_DR_RETt_4 0.578 0.390 1.481 0.140
BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.003 0.069 0.039 0.969 BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.477 0.268 1.783 0.076*
BTC_DR_RETt_6 0.051 0.049 1.035 0.302 BTC_DR_RETt_6 0.158 0.193 0.817 0.415
DY -0.407 0.114 -3.578 0.000*** DY 0.461 0.108 4.267 0.000***
DY_DR_RET 1.464 0.807 1.814 0.071* DY_DR_RET 0.159 0.995 0.159 0.874
DY_DR_RETt_1 0.251 0.291 0.862 0.390 DY_DR_RETt_1 -0.331 0.868 -0.382 0.703
DY_DR_RETt_2 1.035 0.563 1.837 0.068* DY_DR_RETt_2 1.746 0.728 2.400 0.017**
DY_DR_RETt_3 -0.234 0.433 -0.541 0.589 DY_DR_RETt_3 2.500 0.675 3.707 0.000***
DY_DR_RETt_4 -0.241 0.433 -0.556 0.579 DY_DR_RETt_4 2.647 0.625 4.238 0.000***
DY_DR_RETt_5 -0.954 0.252 -3.780 0.132 DY_DR_RETt_5 1.356 0.520 2.608 0.010***
DY_DR_RETt_6 -1.053 0.300 -3.511 0.171 DY_DR_RETt_6 -0.075 0.462 -0.163 0.871
DY_BTC_DR_RETt -0.351 0.676 -0.520 0.604 DY_BTC_DR_RETt 0.039 1.148 0.034 0.973
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_1 0.626 0.380 1.647 0.101 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_1 1.010 0.983 1.027 0.305
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_2 0.024 0.338 0.072 0.943 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_2 -0.529 0.874 -0.605 0.546
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_3 0.479 0.380 1.263 0.208 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_3 -1.864 0.845 -2.206 0.028**
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_4 0.882 0.422 2.088 0.038** DY_BTC_DR_RETt_4 -0.433 0.617 -0.702 0.484
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.939 0.347 2.707 0.007*** DY_BTC_DR_RETt_5 -0.158 0.552 -0.286 0.775
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_6 0.791 0.318 2.486 0.014** DY_BTC_DR_RETt_6 0.491 0.519 0.946 0.345
CSVj = 1 – ?? j; with ?? j given by equations 6 and 7. 
Ibovespa = Bovespa index.
***, **, *: statistical signi cance to 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Th e results for equation 7 (Table 4) do not present any 
indications that taxation is related with unconditional 
conservatism in the companies that comprise the sample, 
since the coeffi  cient of the BTC variable for equation 7 is 
positive (0.347, as in Table 4). Unlike what the research 
hypothesis proposes, the results for equations 6 and 7, 
presented in Table 4, mean that it cannot be stated that 
unconditional conservatism in the earnings reported by 
publicly-traded Brazilian companies subject to greater 
stock market monitoring reduces aft er the advent of tax 
neutrality, with the passing of Law n. 11,638/2007 (Brasil, 
2007).
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Table 5 Results from the unconditional conservatism model for the non-Ibovespa sample: complete study horizon
Book-value-based measure of unconditional conservatism
Companies not participating in the Ibovespa
Dependent variable = BTM
Results for equation 6 Results for equation 7
R² within 0.4270       R² adjusted 0.5779      
p (F) 0.0000       p (F) 0.0000      
Variable Coeffi cient
Standard
error
t-ratio p Coeffi cient
Standard
error
t-ratio p
const 2.311 0.357 6.471 0.000*** CCF -0.035 0.187 -0.187 0.852
RETt -0.762 0.206 -3.700 0.000*** RETt -0.105 0.218 -0.481 0.631
RETt_1 -0.796 0.171 -4.661 0.000*** RETt_1 0.016 0.206 0.078 0.938
RETt_2 -0.523 0.132 -3.964 0.000*** RETt_2 0.137 0.194 0.707 0.480
RETt_3 -0.295 0.188 -1.565 0.119 RETt_3 0.191 0.175 1.093 0.275
RETt_4 -0.276 0.128 -2.159 0.032** RETt_4 0.084 0.169 0.499 0.618
RETt_5 -0.186 0.128 -1.453 0.147 RETt_5 0.116 0.164 0.710 0.478
RETt_6 -0.086 0.099 -0.870 0.385 RETt_6 0.134 0.169 0.789 0.431
DR_RETt 0.003 0.380 0.007 0.995 DR_RETt -0.408 0.576 -0.709 0.479
DR_RETt_1 -2.252 1.433 -1.572 0.117 DR_RETt_1 -5.581 0.907 -6.154 0.000***
DR_RETt_2 -1.081 1.215 -0.890 0.374 DR_RETt_2 -4.965 0.991 -5.011 0.000***
DR_RETt_3 -0.681 0.745 -0.914 0.362 DR_RETt_3 -4.412 1.120 -3.941 0.000***
DR_RETt_4 0.180 0.611 0.294 0.769 DR_RETt_4 -1.753 0.638 -2.749 0.006***
DR_RETt_5 0.586 0.396 1.477 0.141 DR_RETt_5 -0.465 0.515 -0.903 0.367
DR_RETt_6 0.335 0.309 1.085 0.279 DR_RETt_6 -0.793 0.493 -1.609 0.109
BTC_DR_RETt 1.209 0.662 1.828 0.609 BTC_DR_RETt 0.214 0.770 0.278 0.781
BTC_DR_RETt_1 0.134 2.485 0.054 0.957 BTC_DR_RETt_1 0.610 1.437 0.425 0.671
BTC_DR_RETt_2 -1.208 2.145 -0.563 0.574 BTC_DR_RETt_2 0.534 1.503 0.355 0.723
BTC_DR_RETt_3 0.199 1.121 0.178 0.859 BTC_DR_RETt_3 1.553 1.758 0.883 0.378
BTC_DR_RETt_4 0.233 0.226 1.032 0.303 BTC_DR_RETt_4 0.376 0.437 0.860 0.390
BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.476 0.316 1.508 0.133 BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.320 0.591 0.541 0.589
BTC_DR_RETt_6 -1.359 0.347 -3.916 0.000*** BTC_DR_RETt_6 -0.839 0.807 -1.040 0.299
DY -0.999 0.205 -4.861 0.000*** DY 0.825 0.170 4.854 0.000***
4.2.2 Results for the companies not participating in 
the Ibovespa.
As shown in Table 5, the average intercept of the fi rms 
(“const” Table 5 – Results for equation 6) is signifi cantly 
greater than 1 (2.311), indicating that, on average, the 
book value of the fi rms is greater than their market value, 
which is incompatible with the presence of unconditional 
conservatism.
DY_DR_RET -0.100 0.452 -0.221 0.825 DY_DR_RET -0.056 0.657 -0.084 0.933
DY_DR_RETt_1 2.151 1.306 1.647 0.101 DY_DR_RETt_1 5.503 0.881 6.246 0.000***
DY_DR_RETt_2 0.851 1.178 0.723 0.470 DY_DR_RETt_2 4.740 0.962 4.927 0.000***
DY_DR_RETt_3 0.205 0.674 0.304 0.762 DY_DR_RETt_3 3.878 1.115 3.477 0.001***
DY_DR_RETt_4 -0.041 0.770 -0.053 0.958 DY_DR_RETt_4 1.376 0.679 2.027 0.043**
DY_DR_RETt_5 -0.464 0.370 -1.255 0.210 DY_DR_RETt_5 -0.112 0.578 -0.195 0.846
DY_DR_RETt_6 -0.245 0.340 -0.720 0.472 DY_DR_RETt_6 0.518 0.504 1.028 0.305
DY_BTC_DR_RETt -0.720 0.706 -1.020 0.309 DY_BTC_DR_RETt -0.563 1.061 -0.531 0.596
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_1 0.386 2.634 0.146 0.884 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_1 -0.533 1.509 -0.353 0.724
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_2 1.523 2.281 0.668 0.505 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_2 -0.572 1.560 -0.367 0.714
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_3 0.307 1.050 0.292 0.770 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_3 -0.782 1.821 -0.429 0.668
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_4 -0.273 0.457 -0.598 0.550 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_4 0.482 0.762 0.632 0.528
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_5 -0.362 0.439 -0.825 0.410 DY_BTC_DR_RETt_5 0.665 0.793 0.839 0.402
DY_BTC_DR_RETt_6 1.356 0.458 2.959 0.003*** DY_BTC_DR_RETt_6 0.858 0.918 0.935 0.351
CSVj = 1 – ?? j; with ?? j given by equations 6 and 7.  
Ibovespa = Bovespa index.
***, **, *: statistical signi cance to 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Tabela 6 Summary of the results for the unconditional conservatism model
Book-value-based measure of unconditional conservatism
Dependent variable = BTM
Companies participating in the Ibovespa
Variable Model (equations) 2002 to 2007 2008 to 2014 Complete period
Coeffi cients
Average intercept of the fi rms (const) 3 and 6 1.171** 0.263 0.745***
BTC 5 and 7 0.378*** 0.520*** 0.346***
Interpretation
Indications of unconditional conservatism 3 and 6 No No Yes
BTC leads to reduction bias in the intercept 5 and 7 No No No
Companies not listed on the Ibovespa
Coeffi cients
Average intercept of the fi rms (const) 3 and 6 1.598 1.072*** 2.310***
BTC 5 and 7 0.283 0.554*** -0.035
Interpretation
Indications of unconditional conservatism 3 and 6 No No No
BTC leads to reduction bias in the intercept 5 and 7 No No No
BTM = book-to-market; BTC = book-tax conformity; Ibovespa = Bovespa index.
***, **, *: statistical signi cance to 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Prepared by the authors.
In order to verify whether BTC leads to a persistent 
reduction bias in the BTM ratio for the fi rms that comprise 
the sample, we observed the estimated results for equation 
7. According to Table 5, it cannot be concluded that BTC 
leads to a lower average intercept for the fi rms, since 
although the coeffi  cient of the BTC variable is negative 
(-0.035 in the results for equation 7), it is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, from the results it cannot be 
stated whether tax neutrality infl uences unconditional 
conservatism in the companies not participating in the 
Ibovespa, as there is no evidence that BTC leads to this 
phenomenon in the companies that comprise the sample.
4.2.3 Summary of the results.
In Table 6 the results for equations 3 and 6 are presented 
for the periods before and aft er tax neutrality, for each one 
of the subsamples. Also, the main results for equations 5 
and 7 are presented again for the complete study horizon.
With regards to the companies that are subject to 
greater stock market monitoring, no indications of 
unconditional conservatism are found in the period 
before the beginning of tax neutrality (average intercept 
of 1.171, therefore greater than 1). Worth noting is that 
the estimated value for the average intercept of the fi rms 
in the period is instigating, since despite unconditional 
conservatism not providing relevant content for investors 
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), the persistent overvaluation 
of market value may still adversely aff ect contractual 
effi  ciency in the fi nancial markets.
If assets are correctly priced by the market and the share 
price refl ects all of the information available regarding 
a fi rm at any given moment, a book value greater than 
market value may indicate that the accounting information 
does not incorporate an economic loss that is already 
priced by investors. Unlike what occurred in the period 
before the advent of tax neutrality, a bias for increasing the 
average BTM of the fi rms participating in the Ibovespa is 
not verifi ed when observing the complete study horizon.
With regards to the influence of taxation on 
unconditional conservatism, it is noted that BTC does 
not lead to a persistent reduction bias in the earnings 
reported by the companies participating on the Ibovespa, 
as seen in the results for the complete study horizon. 
Although the estimated value for the average intercept 
of the fi rms (0.745) is consistent with the presence of 
unconditional conservatism, this reduction bias is not 
caused by the relationship between accounting profi t 
and taxable income, which is expected in a tax neutrality 
context.
As for the value found for the average intercept of 
the fi rms in the period aft er the advent of tax neutrality, 
this is not statistically significant and it cannot be 
concluded whether there are indications of unconditional 
conservatism in the earnings reported from 2008 to 2014 
by the companies participating in the Ibovespa.
For the companies subject to less market monitoring, 
no indications of unconditional conservatism are verifi ed 
in any of the periods observed and no conclusions can 
be made regarding the infl uence of tax neutrality on 
this phenomenon during the study horizon. It bears 
mentioning that, on average, the book value of the fi rms 
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that comprise the sample is greater than their market 
value in all of the analysis periods. Unlike the companies 
participating in the Ibovespa, those that do not participate 
in the index maintain a bias for increasing the BTM ratio 
aft er IFRS convergence in Brazil, from 2008 onwards.
5. CONCLUSION
Th is paper aimed primarily to verify whether the advent 
of tax neutrality infl uences unconditional conservatism 
in publicly-traded Brazilian companies.
In order to achieve this objective, we started from the 
assumption that companies are subject to diff erent levels 
of stock market monitoring in Brazil. As the incentives for 
fi nancial disclosure by fi rms can lead to heterogeneous 
accounting choices, the tests were carried out separately 
for companies subject to more or less market monitoring, 
using participation or not in the Ibovespa as a proxy.
Th e results found for the relationship between taxation 
and fi nancial reporting, in the context of tax neutrality, 
are not very clear. By observing the fi rms subject to 
greater market monitoring, it cannot be stated that 
unconditional conservatism in reported earnings reduces 
aft er tax neutrality. Among the companies subject to less 
monitoring, no indications of unconditional conservatism 
are verifi ed, but a persistent bias for increasing the average 
BTM of the fi rms is. 
For the companies listed in the Ibovespa, the results for 
the complete study horizon indicate that unconditional 
conservatism is not caused by the relationship between 
accounting profi t and taxable income, which is expected 
in a tax neutrality context. Th is can be considered as the 
main evidence found in the study.
With regard to the quality of earnings reported in 
Brazil, unconditional conservatism is only verifi ed for 
the companies participating in the Ibovespa. It bears 
mentioning that although a persistent bias for reducing the 
BTM ratio is undesirable, a bias for increasing adversely 
aff ects fi nancial market effi  ciency even more, which was 
observed for the fi rms subject to less market monitoring.
Th e results found for the companies not listed in the 
Ibovespa is similar to the fi ndings of Santos and Cavalcante 
(2014), who did not fi nd any evidence that IFRS adoption 
has produced eff ects on unconditional conservatism in 
publicly-traded Brazilian companies. Similarly, Dutra and 
Costa (2014) conclude that there is no conservatism in 
Brazil, since they fi nd indications of upfront recognition 
of gains in relation to losses. Alves and Martinez (2014) 
investigated the eff ects of Brazil’s adhesion to IFRS on 
unconditional conservatism in large Brazilian companies, 
but did not fi nd any indications of a change in the level 
of conservatism in the earnings reported by these entities 
between 2005 and 2010.
With regards to unconditional conservatism, no 
studies were found in Brazil for comparing the results 
of this study.
Th e main limitation of this study lies in the restriction 
with regards to generalization of the fi ndings. Th e validity 
of the relationships studied is limited to the study 
sample and no inferences can be made for the rest of the 
population. It is emphasized, however, that the reduced 
sample derives from the absence of data necessary for the 
variables that comprise the econometric model.
Another limitation derives from the criterion for 
classifying fi rms as participating in the Ibovespa or not 
and this considering a theoretical portfolio of assets in the 
index only for the period from May to August of 2015.
Moreover, the econometric modeling used does not 
consider conservatism to be endogenously determined 
depending on unexpected returns, with this being a 
recently discussed issue in studies that involve estimates 
of conditional and unconditional conservatism.
Over the course of the article, new research 
opportunities in the accounting-tax fi eld were detected. Th e 
relationship between taxation and earnings quality could 
be investigated via analysis of the content of explanatory 
notes, which may present subtle but useful information 
on tax planning strategies and a fi rm’s relationship with 
deferred taxes. Moreover, new models could be used 
with the aim of observing, from other perspectives, the 
infl uence of taxation on fi nancial reporting.
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